ABSTRACT

I examine the focuses of executive managers and how do they use information to make firm-level financial decisions. Corporations are sensitive to both the macroeconomic and firm-specific challenges. Executives must correspondingly choose overall attention capacity and allocate finite attention between these topics. By using natural language processing and quarterly earnings call transcripts, I assess the information content of this dialog. Attention capacity quantifies the effective information used to make financing decisions, consisting of information used in processing macro and firm-specific issues. Attention allocation measures the ratio of attention paid to macroeconomics. Keeping others constant, managers with a higher attention capacity use more information in decision-making, and can tolerate a higher empirical leverage ratio. Allocating higher ratio of attention towards macroeconomics distracts managers from learning about firm-specific challenges, thus lowers the empirical leverage ratio. Managers increase attention capacity and optimize attention allocation in response to rising uncertainty in the environment. Given increased volatility in macro, managers expand attention to macroeconomics, resulting in a higher attention capacity (scale effect) and maybe higher attention allocation to macroeconomics (substitution effect). Theoretically, I analyze an optimal static capital structure model with endogenous information choice. The model reproduces the key phenomenology as in the empirical part.

Keywords: leverage ratio, information rigidity, natural language processing, macro and firm-specific shocks

*American University, dl5165a@american.edu. I would like to thank Xuguang Sheng, Gabriel Mathy, Valentina Bruno and Steven J. Davis for their helpful comments. I thank American University for providing high performance computing support.
1. Introduction

The recent nonfinancial business leverage has mounted to record-high levels as shown in Figure A.1. The data demonstrate that leverage ratio increases during economic downturns. The co-occurrence of aggregate leverage peak and economy pledge opens new research possibilities. The impact of macroeconomics on firm financial decisions is addressed (Duffie et al., 2003; Fama, 1986; Hackbarth et al., 2006). Corporate finance literature traditionally explains the leverage variation with firm characteristics, liquidity, adjustment cost and policy. Despite the efforts, volatility and heterogeneity in firm-level leverage remains partially unexplained. This paper aims to explain the historically high leverage during the economic downturn and address the unexplained parts by introducing behavioral factors.

The approaches above assume that decision makers either have perfect information or do not have any learning process at all. When a manager processes perfect information, she knows the exact future outcomes. When a manager does not pay attention, she estimates future outcomes with larger uncertainty. Being partially attentive is more prevalent in business. Both inner communication (Robson and Tourish, 2005) and external environment (Hassan et al., 2019; Baker et al., 2016), require managerial attention, information acquisition and information processing. The managers do not always have information or don’t use the information in decision-making despite the awareness. Inefficient attention allocation is more common. Obstacles of using known information includes the need to prioritize timing over optimization, unexpected project delays and high uncertainty of the new information. Thus, limited attention can cause frictions that deviates a firm from the greatest value. Despite careful investigation in production and investment decision-making, limited attention have not yet been considered in corporate finance. To investigate the role of information channels, this paper introduces an endogenous information decision-making process into a static optimal financial structure model. Managers choose their attention capacity and attention allocation before making optimal financial decisions.


3 Lemmon et al. (2008) points out that firm-level leverage has an unexplained time-varying component. Graham and Leary (2011) makes the same argument of cross-section leverage variations.
Research about information rigidity commonly treats attention capacity and attention allocation as constant. The agent’s ability to learn from new information and the attention ratio allocated to each field are assumed constant over time. Does managerial attention capacity stay constant? What factors do managers consider when optimizing information decisions? Does limited attention affect firm-level capital structure? Can managerial attention help explain the unprecedented high level of business leverage?

To answer the questions, this paper first seeks to measure and analyze the information channel of managers’ financial decision making. The raw material that I used to construct the measurements are the earnings call transcripts. Public listed firms are required by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to host quarterly earnings conference calls to reveal information about company operations and exchange information with investors. During the conference, the executive managers present and discuss a company’s current and future operation, revenue, cash flow and financing status. The documented text thus reveals managers’ attention and work priorities. Using this raw text, I construct two novel firm-level attention measurements for 3481 firms and examine the quantity and the priority of managers attention. Attention capacity, which is the sum of attention paid to macroeconomic and firm-specific components, measures the amount of information that a manager processes to make the financial decision. Attention allocation describes a ratio of attention that a manager distributes to each component. After discussing the construction and validation of the attention measures, I use the new time series of firm-level attention to document several new findings. Details about the measurements can be found in Section Two.

At the aggregate level, attention capacity is counter cyclical whereas attention allocation to macroeconomics has an upward trend. Heterogeneity exists and the cross-section distribution variances of both indexes are larger during recessions. Further analysis documents that managerial attention capacity positively correlates with firm size, profitability, tangibility, market to book value and leverage. Attention allocation is positively related to firm size and profitability while it is negatively correlated with the market-to-book value, tangibility and leverage. Attention capacity is time-variant and affected by uncertainty in the business environment. The uncertainty comes from two parts, macro and firm-specific components, in which the mechanism of information work in the same way. It is difficult to analyze when the uncertainty in both component changes simultaneously. To simplify the process, I keep the firm-specific volatility constant while making the macro volatility variant for most cases throughout this paper. The effect stays the same either way.

There are two key findings in the empirical analysis. First, high attention capacity increases the leverage ratio, while high attention allocation towards macroeconomics decreases the leverage ratio. This empirical result reflects the close relationship between
managerial information decisions and financial decisions. The more information used in making financial decisions, the higher leverage ratio that the managers can tolerate. Using macro-related information substitutes managers' I conclude this finding as to the scale and substitution effects of managers being attentive to macroeconomics. Suppose the firm-specific volatility stays constant; higher macro volatility leads to increased managerial attention to macroeconomics and improved attention capacity. With increased attention capacity, managers gain more information about the fundamental economy and thus improve the precision of estimated optimal financial structure. Managers can risk a higher leverage by being more aware of their own financing situations. At the same time, paying attention to macroeconomics can crowd out the attention allocated to firm-specific issues, resulting in a lower estimation precision, making managers conservative about borrowing decisions. This finding is robust when considering firms' financial constraints and industrial cyclical sensitivity. The second finding documents that the information channel represented by attention capacity and attention allocation can amplify the effect of the business cycle on leverage ratio. Recession features low economic growth rates and high uncertainty. Motivated by high macro uncertainty, managers choose to pay more attention to macroeconomics and increase the weight of macro factors when making an optimal financing decision. I also found that when adding an aggregate uncertainty measurement, the coefficient of GDP growth rate becomes insignificant, suggesting that the information channel connects the macro environment through the second moment instead of the first moment.

The findings in the empirical part motivate the design of the theoretical model. Following the theory of rational inattention, I assume that agents have limited attention and cannot process all the available information. Managers' attention capacity and attention allocation are inertial in financial decision making, because they determines managers' believes about the internal and external environment and estimation precision of future conditions. Three major elements are incorporated into a firm's financial decisions. First, a representative firm chooses an optimal information decision before maximizing the value of the firm. The information decision consists of attention capacity, the amount of information, and attention allocation, which is how to allocate limited attention between macroeconomics and firm-specific issues. Second, the decisions of attention capacity are based on the total volatility of the company. Third, the attention allocation is determined by both the attention capacity and comparative variances of macro versus firm-specific components. The information choice is time-varying.

This paper makes three contributions. First, by using quarterly earnings call transcripts and natural language processing (NLP), I construct two novel firm-level measurements of managers' attention: attention capacity and attention allocation. Attention capacity measures the amount of effective information that managers acquired. Atten-
tion allocation measures the ratio of attention distributed to the macroeconomics. Both the measurements are time-varying, indicating that managerial attention capacity and attention allocation are correlated with other time-varying factors. Consistent with information rigidity theory, the agent’s attention capacity index is positively correlated with the variance of related variables. For example, the attention capacity is higher during a recession, when the economic uncertainty is high. Second, I investigate if the time-varying attention measurements help explain the variance and heterogeneity of firm-level leverage ratio. With these two measurements, I document that managers’ leverage ratio decision is positively correlated with their attention capacity and negatively correlated with attention allocation towards macroeconomics. To interpret the correlations, paying attention to macroeconomics has both substitution and scale effects on managerial financial decisions using firm-specific information. By looking at the role of the business cycle, I further document that managerial attention to macroeconomics amplifies the effect of the business cycle on the firm-level leverage ratio. Finally, I build a theoretical model integrating rational inattention theory and corporate finance. The rational inattention theory is extended to geometric Brownian motion. The model aims at making managerial information choice endogenous based on the precision of past estimation. The model reproduces the same phenomenology as found in empirical analysis.

Related Literature This paper relates to three strands of literature. The first addresses the role of macroeconomics in a firm’s financial decision. The second strand highlights the role of information rigidity in agents’ decision-making processes. The last strand of literature attempts to use machine learning techniques and text data to measure abstract concepts in economics, such as uncertainty, risk and attention.

Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), economists have made efforts to understand firms’ financing policy quantitatively. Traditional studies of corporate finance focus more on firm-specific conditions. A heightened volume of research appearing in the past 20 years highlights the role of macroeconomics in determining capital structure. Business cycles can affect a firm’s financial choice with default risk, credit risk, liquidity and cash flow. Several discrepancies remain in both theoretical and empirical studies. For example, Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian et al. (2004) and provide evidence that various firm characteristics are related to a firm’s leverage ratio. Choe et al. (1993) first show that macroeconomics are important factors of a firm’s financing choices. Levy and Hennessy (2007) and Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy (2020) share the same idea. Indeed the three major theories (trade-off, pecking-order, and market timing) of a firm’s financing decisions all emphasize the role of macroeconomics.

Fama (1986) and Duffie et al. (2000) provide evidence that business cycles impact the probability of default. Hack Barth et al. (2006) study the role of credit risk. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) first document the role of the supply-side of liquidity. Firms that have access to public bond markets choose
ical results. First, theoretical studies yield both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical patterns of leverage ratio. A large variation and heterogeneity in a firm’s leverage choice remains unexplained.

This paper contributes to the corporate finance literature in the following three ways: 1) I introduce rational inattention as a new factor including firm-level leverage variations. Corporations are critically sensitive to both the macroeconomic environment and firm-specific challenges. Being attentive to macroeconomics increases the firm’s leverage ratio by expanding the attention capacity. Paying attention to macroeconomics, in contrast, lowers the leverage ratio by crowding out managers’ focus on firm-specific issues. 2) I study the information channel, through which the business cycle influences the leverage ratio. The results further point out that the aggregate uncertainty contributes to the influence instead of the first moment. 3) I introduce time-varying attention capacity and attention allocation into a static optimal capital structure model. Before making firm value-maximizing decisions, managers make optimal information decisions.

This paper also closely connects with information rigidity literature. As Gabaix (2019) points out, “Traditional rational economics assumes that we process all the information that is freely available to us.” Much research shows that agents’ attention level is roughly halfway between paying attention and not paying attention (Gabaix, 2019). A new wave of studies investigate the role of an agent’s attention in the decision-making process. Most research focuses on the real economic activity, such as consumer decisions, managers’ decisions on real production and hiring, professional forecasters’ behavior on forecasting (Mackowiak et al., 2009; Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Flynn and Sastry, 2021; Andrade et al., 2021; Chen et al., 2021). Recent findings show that managers treat information from macro and micro sources differently.\footnote{Korajczyk and Levy (2003) document that macroeconomic conditions affect financially unconstrained firm’s capital structure choice but not for financially constrained firms. Begenau and Salomo (2019) note that large and small firms use different financing policies over the business cycle.\footnote{Meyer et al., 2021, Chen et al., 2021 and Candida et al., 2021 show that compared to firm-specific issues, managers pay less attention towards macro conditions. Candida et al., 2021 further points out that the inflation expectations of U.S. managers appear far from anchored. U.S. managers are largely uninformed about recent aggregate inflation dynamics or monetary policy. Mackowiak et al., 2009 point out that decision-makers in firms pay significantly more attention to sector-specific conditions than to aggregate conditions.}
A few papers shed lights on information rigidity in finance. Efforts are mostly made to explain an investor’s investment behavior. Kacperczyk et al. (2016) investigate if mutual fund managers allocate attention rationally. They use an attention allocation model and find that some investment managers have skill and that attention is allocated rationally. Sicherman et al. (2016) examine investors’ financial attention by using novel panel data on daily investor online account logins. They find that investor attention declines when the volatility index (VIX) arises. Hirshleifer and Sheng (2021) study firm-level earnings announcements. They find that aside from substitution effects, there is also a complementary relationship between macro and micro news. Dessein and Santos (2021) build a theoretical model and focus on the allocation of managerial attention. They yield that a manager’s behavior matters more in a complex environment. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) point out investors have limited attention and ability to process information. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) demonstrate that limited attention results in market reactions to relevant news. Overall, there is a good amount of theoretical articles. Comparatively, empirical research on attention has been slowly developed because of measurement challenges. Peng and Xiong (2006) discover that investors’ limited attention leads to category-learning behavior. Investors allocate more attention to market and sectoral information than to firm-specific information. Other related paper includes Peng (2005) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010).

There are, so far, six ways to measure attention: 1) deviations from an optimal action (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Baker et al., 2020; An, 2019); 2) deviations from normative cross-partial; 3) physical measurement (e.g., eye-tracking); 4) surveys (Meyer et al., 2021; Candia et al., 2021); 5) imputations from the impact of attentional interventions; 6) natural language processing (Hassan et al., 2019, 2021; Flynn and Sastry, 2021). Each method has pros and cons. Using deviations from an optimal action provide accessible data but may cause misalignment issues. The microdata speak more about more of forecasters’ attention than managers’ attention. One needs to be aware of this difference when using forecasters’ expectations as the proxy of managers’ actions. Survey data are straightforward, consistent and timely. The drawback of using survey data is that the process is costly and time consuming. This paper uses the NLP method. NLP can directly measure managerial attention revealed by the raw text. It is efficient, objective and easy to replicate.

This paper differs from the literature in the following three ways: 1) I focus on firm-level managerial attention and examine both the quantity and the allocation of attention. I first study the factors that can influence managerial attention. The impact of aggregate conditions. For similar findings see Zhang (2017)

\[10\] This classification builds on Gabaix’s (2019) and DellaVigna’s (2009) work.
agerial attention is also carefully estimated. 2) I provide novel quarterly measurements of attention capacity and attention allocation for around two decades. The use of NLP makes the measurements objective, efficient and replicable. 3) I first incorporate the rational inattention model with a contingent claims paradigm. The possibility of using a rational inattention model under Brownian motion is also explored.

This paper also relates to the application of machine learning and natural language processing in social science. Classic applications can be found in Baker et al. (2016), Hassan et al. (2019, 2021) and Flynn and Sastry (2021). “Measuring attention is still a hard task” (Gabaix 2019). Measuring an abstract concept such as attention is challenging. Another independent research using similar methodology is Flynn and Sastry (2021) (hereafter FS), which uses the term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) and 10-Q documents to construct the macroeconomic attention. They focus on the aggregate level of informativeness and find that firm attention to macroeconomics is counter-cyclical at the aggregate level.

This paper differs from the previous research in the following two ways: 1) I focus on the information perspective of the measurement using TF-IDF and provide rationalization that the two independent measurements are additive; 2) I make the connection of empirical measurement with the rational inattention model based on information theory because both TF-IDF and the rational inattention model are built on information theory and share the same unit - one bit of information.

This paper closely relates to and inspired by three papers. The first is Flynn and Sastry (2021) (hereafter FS). They use a similar NLP method to generate attention measurement to macroeconomics and investigate the impact of business cycles on firms’ producing decisions. My paper differs from FS in the following three ways. FS focuses only on firm’s attention to macroeconomics, while I endogenize firm’s information decision. By considering managerial attention quantity and allocation choice, I emphasize the role of attention to macroeconomics differently. In FS, a firm make fewer mistakes by being attentive to macroeconomics. Whereas, I discover the substitution and scale effect of managers being attentive to macro environment. Second, on top of FS’s contribution of attention measurement using NLP, my paper further connects information theory with the measurement of TF-IDF. I prove mathematically that using TF-IDF on the same text, the managers’ attention to different aspects are additive. Thus, it opens up great possibilities to investigate managers’ attention distribution. Third, I focus on firm’s financing decision instead of producing decision. I first introduce RI into a static optimal capital structure model. My paper also closely related to Zhang (2017). We conclude from different methods that attention capacity is state-dependent. Zhang (2017) applies Markov-switching factor-augmented vector autoregression (MS-FAVAR) analysis on disaggregate personal
consumption expenditure (PCE). Whereas, I directly measure managers’ attention using text data. Inspired by the empirical evidence, we make the same assumption, that information decisions depend on the variance of information from different aspects, in the theoretical models. Second, we both emphasize the role of attention to macroeconomics. But differently, I focus on firm-level evidence for financing decisions, while Zhang (2017) focuses on sectional evidence and producing decisions. The third closely related paper is Hirshleifer and Sheng (2021). This paper examines the sensitivity of stock market reactions to earnings news on days either with or without major macroeconomic announcements. Their result suggests a complementary relationship between macro news and firm-level news, while the existing theories suggest that macro and firm-level earnings news are attention substitutes. Similarly, my paper suggests both substitution and scale effects. This paper differs from Hirshleifer and Sheng (2021) with data and agents. Instead of investigating investors and focusing on earnings announcements, I emphasize managers’ financial decisions and generate a direct measurement of managerial attention to both macro and firm-specific challenges.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines and introduces the measurement of managers’ attention capacity and attention allocation, using quarterly earnings call transcripts and TF-IDF. I then discuss the factors that determine attention capacity and attention allocation. The findings reveal the time-varying and heterogeneity of the two measurements. Section 3 investigates the role of managerial attention in making financing decisions. I then examine the effect of business cycle on firm-level leverage ratio and present the evidence of both substitute and scale effects. I focus on firm’s financial constraints and cyclical sensitivity for robust tests. Section 4 describes the theoretical model combined by rational inattention framework and optimal capital structure with contingent claims diagram. Section 6 concludes.

2. Measuring C-Suite’s Attention Capacity and Attention Allocation

This section introduces the construction of the two key variables of this paper: attention capacity and attention allocation. I start this section with the definition of attention capacity and attention allocation. I then introduce the text data used to generate the variable, which are the quarterly earnings call transcripts and the textbooks. Next, I show the methods to prepare the documents. Finally, I demonstrate the TF-IDF algorithm in detail, the key terms selected for each attention category, and how to interpret the results.

2.1 Attention Capacity and Attention Allocation
Entering the big data era, we are fighting for limited attention and learning to optimally allocate our attention. The limited attention comes from three parts. First, we all have twenty-four hours per day, and we each decide how to make the best of it. Second, the majority of us can only focus on one thing at a time (reference). Multitasking usually lowers one’s work efficiency. Third, we have limited capacity for information processing. For example, human performs poorer in complicated computation compared to computers (reference). Sims (2006) points out that due to Shannon capacity, there is always an upper bound of information transaction rate between the input and the output. In this paper, I define managerial attention capacity as the upper bound of information transaction rate when a manager works. This is the key to understand the heterogeneity as well as that executive managers in large firms have on average higher attention capacity than the same level managers in small firms, as I will show in the empirical research part. Because first, acquiring knowledge about the macro environment is harder and more costly than firm-specific issues. Large firms can afford news terminals, such as Bloomberg, and macro consultancy services. Second, large firms usually have larger exposure to macroeconomics, making the cost of not paying attention higher. In another word, executive managers in smaller firms are rationally inattentive to macroeconomic information.

We are making attention allocation decisions all the time. The problem can come from, whether multitasking, to should I spend the time working, or have fun in nature. In this paper, I provide a narrow definition of attention allocation. Only considering executive managers’ working time, I define attention allocation as the percent ratio of attention that an executive manager pays to macroeconomic information. Executive managers are known to have tight schedules. When making a decision, they need to consider both the outside environment and only firm-related issues. They also make an effort with both inner and outer communication. Sometimes a decision has to be made before thorough considerations. Thus, paying attention to macroeconomics can help managers collect useful information as well as distracts managers from focusing on tasks that are known critical to firm development.

2.2 Quarterly Earnings call Transcripts

I use the quarterly Earnings Call Transcript of publicly listed firms to construct manager’s attention. I first measure managers’ attention toward macroeconomic and firm-specific conditions separately.

An earnings call conference is held once every quarter before its 10-Q or 10-K

\footnote{Also used in Hassan et al. (2019), Flynn and Sastry (2021) and Hassan et al. (2021)}
available, in the form of teleconference or webcast. A public listed company uses the call as an opportunity to discuss the financial results, the cause, and the forecasting of future operations of a reporting period (quarterly). The calls usually happen when the stock market is closed so that all investors can have a chance to learn about this company’s performance before trading. To make sure investors and analysts are informed about the calls, the notices of the earnings calls are usually announced a few days or weeks in advance. The notifications are usually posted on the firm’s website under a section named Investor Relations or Investors. Of course, professional financial data providers such as Bloomberg, FactSet, and Thomson Reuters will remind analysts about the upcoming earnings call. For individual investors, brokers such as Robinhood, push the notifications too. Many companies provide the recordings or presentation slides from the calls for investors who missed the meeting. It is worth noting that though the vast majority of firms host the earnings call conference, some small firms with very few investors have the exemption not to host the earnings call. The call often starts with a safe harbor statement, a presentation, and a discussion of the firm’s financial result and a Q&A session. In the call, the C-Suite also discusses the details of its coming SEC Form 10-Q (quarterly report) or 10-K (annual report).

I choose earnings call transcripts over Form 10-Q for the following three reasons. 1) It consists of the executive manager’s speaking, making sure that I’m measuring the manager’s attention; 2) The statement updates more promptly than the risk part in Form 10-Q, where the same statements can repeat a few times; 3) The call transcripts include a Q&A session where the institutional investors and professional analysts can ask the executive team questions. With the question session, the chance that the executive managers intentionally hide information is smaller than in Form 10-Q and 10-K.

2.3 Textbooks


---

12 A safe harbor statement is made to inform the audience that the discussion can consist of forward-looking statements, which are not factual statements.

13 The edition of the textbooks are 9th, 12th and 12th separately.
Macroeconomics by Mankiw, N. Gregory, Ronald D. Kneebone, Kenneth James McKenzie, and Nicholas Rowe. I present the justification of using text to reference the most informativeness terms in the Term Identification section.

2.4 Preparing The Documents

After obtaining the transcripts from the FactSet database, I conduct the following steps for pre-processing. 1) Each transcript consists of paragraphs and sentences, which are seen as strings in NLP. I perform string tokenization by simply split each document into words and use the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) to drop stop words. 2) I use word stemming to normalize the words with the same root. In this way, words with the same word root can be aggregated. Otherwise, the frequency of the words can be underestimated and thus bias the measurement. The same steps apply to textbooks too.

The NLP algorithm that I use to conduct this measurement is called Term Frequency-Inverted Document Frequency (TF-IDF). It measures whether a word is frequent in a given document, relative to its frequency in the entire corpus. Here, the single document could be a textbook or an earnings call transcript. The corpus is the set of call transcripts.

2.5 Introducing TF-IDF

I start the demonstration of TF-IDF with the definition of the symbols. In this section, $w$ represents each individual term, $d_{f,t}$ represents each individual document for firm $f$ at quarter $t$, which can also be seen as a vector of $w$. $D$ represents the set of earnings call transcript documents across all firms $f$ and all quarters $t$ and $B$ represents the set of textbooks $b$.

The definition of TF-IDF as follows. term-frequency can be seen as the occurrence number of each term $w$ over the total number of words in document $d$. Define $N_d$ as the number of all terms in document $d$, and define $n_{w,d}$ as the frequency of term $w$ appear in document $d$.

---

14 The edition of the textbooks are 14th and 6th separately.

15 Pre-processing refers to the process of converting data to something a computer can understand. Here the goal is to decompose a document into useful words, which serve as a unit.

16 A common library in Python for Natural Language Processing
\[ tf(w, d) := \frac{n_{w,d}}{N_d} \]  

(document-frequency) can be seen as the fraction of documents \( d_{f,t} \) in the set of documents \( D \), that contains the term \( w \). Define \( N_D \) as the number of documents in the set \( D \), and define \( n_{w,D} \) as the number of documents \( d_{f,t} \) that contains the term \( w \).

\[ df(w, D) := \frac{n_{w,D}}{N_D} \]  

\[ idf(w, D) := \log\left(\frac{1}{df(w, D)}\right) \]  

Putting together, the \( tf-idf \), or term-frequency-inverse-document-frequency, measures the weighted occurrence of a term in a document relative to its weighted occurrence in the entire corpus:

\[ tf-idf(w, d_{f,t}, D) := tf(w, d_{f,t}) \cdot idf(w, D) \]

Equation (1) indicates that \( 0 \leq tf(w, d_{f,t}) \leq 1 \). Equation (2) implies that \( 0 \leq df(w, D) \leq 1 \), thus, in Equation (3), \( idf(w, D) \geq 0 \). According to information theory, \( tf(w, d_{f,t}) \) is the probability of a term \( w \) appears in a random word in document \( d_{f,t} \). Analogically, \( df(w, D) \) is the probability of \( w \) appears in in a random document \( d_{f,t} \). Aizawa (2003) demonstrates a way to interpret \( tf-idf \) from the information theory perspective. \( idf(w, D) \) can be seen as the amount of information gain after observing the term \( w \) and \( tf(w, d_{f,t}) \) represents the probability that the term \( w \) is observed. \( tf-idf \) can be the expected information gain of a term \( w \).

2.6 An Example to Present TF-IDF Calculation

In Table 1 below, I present the \( tf-idf \) and the inter-median calculation process for four represented terms. Comparing \( gdp \) and \( monetari \), \( gdp \) occurs more in both the textbook and the \( D \) corpus, thus \( gdp \) has higher \( tf \) and lower \( idf \). As the value of \( tf-idf \) is a simple product of \( tf \) and \( idf \), \( gdp \) ends up with a higher \( tf-idf \) value than \( monetari \). The term \( use \) is a very common word. Thus it has a higher frequency in both textbook and the corpus comparing to \( monetari \). The \( tf \) value of \( monetari \) and \( use \) is the same, but \( use \) has a lower \( idf \). It means that to my sample corpus, \( use \) is less informative than
monetari. Thus, use has a much lower tf-idf value than monetari. Handicraft, on the other hand, rarely occur in either textbook or my sample corpus. Though Handicraft is very informative (with a high idf), it is misleading when expressing macroeconomics news. Thus, handicraft has a low tf-idf despite a high idf. To conclude, idf measures the informativeness of a term within the corpus, while tf measures the relevance of a term to a certain context, which in this paper, is the extent to which a term is relevant to macroeconomic or firm-specific conditions.

Table 1: An Example for Term-level tf-idf Calculation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term Frequency</th>
<th>tf</th>
<th>Document Frequency</th>
<th>idf</th>
<th>tf-idf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gdp</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>11952</td>
<td>2.813</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monetari</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>4.088</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>199065</td>
<td>0.000001</td>
<td>0.000000028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>handicraft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.201</td>
<td>0.000068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows an example of intermediate steps while calculating tf-idf. The data are extracted from \( W_{\text{macro}} \) term identification process using *Macroeconomics Principles and Policy* by Baumol, J. W., and S. A. Blinder.

2.7 Term Identification

The goal of this section is to select a set of terms \( w_{\text{macro}} \) and a set of terms \( w_{\text{firm}} \) that can represent the informativeness of macroeconomic and idiosyncratic conditions separately in the earnings call transcripts, using each textbook \( b_i \), where \( i \) represents textbooks of macroeconomics or corporate finance. I first calculate the \( tf(w, b_i) \) for each term \( w \) that appears in \( b \). Then for each term \( w \) in the earnings call transcript corpus \( D \), I calculate the \( idf(w, D) \). Finally, by combining \( tf(w, b_i) \) and \( idf(w, D) \), I calculate \( tf-idf(w, b_i, D) \). Terms that do not appear in \( b_i \) and \( D \), will be dropped automatically at this step. I then take the top 200 terms with the highest \( tf-idf(w, b_i, D) \) values from terms in each textbook \( b_i \), and take the intersection\(^{17}\) to generate the candidate bag of words \( w_{\text{macro}} \) and \( w_{\text{firm}} \). It is possible that \( w_{\text{macro}} \) and \( w_{\text{firm}} \) contain the same terms that may bias the measurement; thus, I exclude the mutual terms of the two-word sets from each bag of words. In the next section, I use \( w_{\text{macro}} \) and \( w_{\text{firm}} \) to construct the manager’s attention toward macroeconomic and idiosyncratic conditions. Table 2 below shows the final terms for each category.

\(^{17}\)This step helps to eliminate bias from any single textbook.

\(^{18}\)For macroeconomics, I take intersection across terms of two textbooks, and for firm-specific conditions, I take intersection across terms of three textbooks.
Table 2: Terms Selected with TF-IDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro (28)</td>
<td>inflat, unemploy, polici, aggreg, economi, suppli, wage, export, govern, recess, nation, demand, labor, phillip, fiscal, consumpt, feder, econom, consum, employ, macroeconom, currenc, crisi, tariff, foreign, deflat, polit, societi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-specific (24)</td>
<td>bond, dividend, stock, discount, equiti, return, financ, loan, yield, asset, payment, inventori, matur, valuat, borrow, debt, paid, premium, payabl, flow, tax, analysi, pay, depreci</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes:

2.8 Construct the Measurements

The firm-level attention to macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific conditions is defined as follows:

\[
AttentionToMacro(f, t) := \sum_{w \in w_{macro}} tf-idf(w, d_{f,t}, D) \tag{5}
\]

\[
AttentionToFirm(f, t) := \sum_{w \in w_{firm}} tf-idf(w, d_{f,t}, D) \tag{6}
\]

To construct the panel database of the manager’s attention capacity, I simply take the sum of \(AttentionToMacro(f, t)\) (hereafter ATM) and \(AttentionToFirm(f, t)\) (hereafter ATF). The simple summation operation is derived from the additivity of channel capacity\(^{19}\). To adjust for the scale for a better display, I also multiply the obtained value by 100. For attention allocation, I define it as the manager’s attention allocated to macroeconomics. I multiply the value by 100 to present it as a percentage.

\(^{19}\)Defined in Shannon (1948); channel capacity is additive over independent channels
AttentionCapacity\((f,t)\) := \((ATM(f,t) + ATF(f,t)) \times 100\) \quad (7)

AttentionAllocation\((f,t)\) := \(\frac{ATM(f,t) \times 100}{AttentionCapacity(f,t)} \times 100\) \quad (8)

In the following sections, I will mainly use AttentionCapacity and AttentionAllocation in the empirical analysis and the theoretical model.

2.9 Presenting the Managers’ Attention

In this section, I use the constructed novel attention measurements to document the factors that determine managers’ attention, specifically:

1. Managerial attention capacity is positively correlated with firm size, profitability, tangibility, market-to-book value and leverage;

2. Managerial attention capacity is dynamic and counter-cyclical at the aggregate level;

3. Managerial attention allocation to macroeconomics is positively correlated with firm size and profitability, and negatively correlated with tangibility, market-to-book value and leverage;

4. Managerial attention allocation to macroeconomics has a positive drift at the aggregate level;

Figure 2 presents the aggregated C-Suite’s attention towards macroeconomic and firm-level conditions. The managers’ attention capacity is counter-cyclical and positively correlated with firm size and profitability. Intuitively, larger firms have more financial capacity to afford more information about both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic shocks. The counter-cyclical pattern in the managers’ attention is mainly driven by their attention towards macroeconomics. The Covid-19 pandemic triggers more attention towards macroeconomics than the 2008 Financial Crisis. There is no cyclical pattern on attention towards idiosyncratic shocks. The Covid-19 pandemic brings more common shocks than idiosyncratic shocks. It could be that firms with higher exposure to macroeconomics will tend to pay more attention to macroeconomics. This finding is surprisingly consistent with [Lemmon et al. (2008)].
Figure 1: Aggregated Manager’s Attention Towards Macro and Idiosyncratic Conditions, 2004Q1–2020Q3

(a) Attention to Macro Conditions (unit: information gain times 100)

(b) Attention to Firm Conditions (unit: information gain times 100)

Note: This figure shows managers’ attention to macroeconomic and firm-specific conditions. The box-whisker plots represent the distribution of the firm-level attention in each quarter. I only present the second and third quartile for a clearer presentation of the variation. A complete version is shown in the Appendix A. The line plot shows the aggregated attention.

These findings are consistent with rational inattention theory. When the shock is too large to ignore, meaning the cost of not paying attention becomes too high, the agents will choose to pay attention. Firms expend more than 30% of their attention capacity towards macroeconomics during economic downturns. Figure 3 shows the aggregated attention capacity and allocation, the key variables in this paper.

These findings are consistent with rational inattention theory. When the uncertainty of the aggregate environment is high, agents pay more attention to optimize the
Cross-sectional Heterogeneity and Managerial Attention

A natural question arises about what factors determine the revealed attention capacity and attention allocation. Data shows that a manager’s attention capacity is positively correlated with firm size, profitability, tangibility, market-to-book value, and leverage,
while it is negatively correlated with the real GDP growth rate. The managers' attention allocation is positively correlated with firm size and profitability, while it is negatively correlated with the market-to-book value, tangibility, leverage, and real GDP growth rate. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between managerial attention and other firm-level variables.

Table 3: Variable Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leverage(market)</th>
<th>Leverage(book)</th>
<th>AttenCapacity</th>
<th>AttenAllocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firm Size</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-to-Book</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage(market)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage(book)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Managerial attention capacity (hereafter AC) and attention allocation (hereafter AA) towards macroeconomics are counter-cyclical, as macroeconomics news is more salient in a recession than in an expansion. See Figure A.1.

2. AC and AA are size-dependent. Large firms operate business in different states and even different countries; thus, they are more exposed to macroeconomic fluctuations than smaller firms. See Figure A.2.

3. For similar reasons, financially unconstrained firms have higher AC and AA because they attend the public bond market and are more exposed to common shocks than financially constrained firms. See Figure A.3.

4. AC and AA are higher for firms with higher profitability. Because it is costly to understand macroeconomic news and policies, more profitable firms will be more likely to afford the expenses, such as hiring an economist as a consultant and purchasing media services. See Figure A.4.

Whether financially constrained firms or unconstrained firms pay more attention to macroeconomics is ambiguous. There are two reasons with opposite directions. First, unconstrained firms are usually larger firms and can afford to learn more about economic

---

20In a later section, I define financially constrained firms as those with bond ratings, while financially unconstrained firms do not have bond ratings
perspectives. Second, financially constrained firms are more aggressively about obtaining inexpensive credits during expansion and choose to default during economic contractions. For this reason, financially constrained firms should also have incentives to pay attention to business cycles. Without a measurement of attention, the overall effect is unclear. Figure A.3 shows that the first effect dominates.

Attention capacity is a function of uncertainty. In Section 5, I provide an explicit function of attention capacity. Here, I present a plot of aggregate attention capacity and a fitted function of Equation (47), \( \kappa_t = \kappa_0 + \theta \log(\sigma_{x,t}) \). Figure 3 shows the aggregated attention capacity in response to the VIX.

Figure 3: Aggregated Managers’ Attention Capacity and A Fitted Line, 2004Q1 – 2020Q3

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data and Sample Selection

The primary sample includes firms in the quarterly Compustat database. I first restrict the sample to the firms that are listed on the major U.S. Stock Exchanges — the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation (NASDAQ). I then exclude firms that are in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (SIC Codes 6000-6799), regulated division (SIC Codes 4000-4999) and Non-classifiable division (SIC Codes 9900-9999). Table A.1 provides more information on the SIC codes and corresponding divisions. I further drop the firms that have been in business for fewer than two years (eight quarters) as young firms have different financing policies. Finally, to mitigate the effect of outliers and eradicate errors in the data, I trim all variables at the upper and lower 0.5 percentiles. The earnings call transcripts are obtained from the FactSet database and written in English. When indexing the quarter of each call transcript file, I use the quarter when the call happens instead of the quarter to which the discussion applies. In this way, each transcript documents the C-Suite's belief of that time with less than one quarter forward-looking horizon. After merging the two databases, the sample consists of 127678 documents covering the period from 2004Q1 to 2020Q3 for 3481 firms.

Following [Welch (2011)], I define financial debt (FD) over capital (CP) as the leverage ratio, where capital equals to financial debt plus equity. [Welch (2011)] points out that the widely-used leverage ratio defined as financial debt over total assets is biased, as this definition ignores the role of non-financial liabilities. He argues that when using FD over total Asset (AT) as the leverage ratio, the leverage ratio becomes lower when a firm has more equity, and when it has more non-financial liabilities. In effect, non-financial liabilities are counted the same as equity. Under this definition, there are two ways to define capital: book value of capital (BCP) and market value of capital (MCP). Other variables are shown in Table 3. Table 4 shows the summary of variables.

Figure A.5 shows the industry distribution of the sample.
Table 4: Variable Construction Using the Compustat Sample (Quarterly)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial debt (FD)</td>
<td>long-term debt (DLTTQ) + debt in current liabilities (DLCQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market value of capital (MCP)</td>
<td>Financial debt (FD) + market value of equity (MEQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market value of equity (MEQ)</td>
<td>Close price (PRCCQ) × common share outstanding (CSHQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book value of capital (BCP)</td>
<td>Financial debt (FD) + book value of equity (BEQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book value of equity (BEQ)</td>
<td>Stock-holders equity (SEQQ) + non-controlling interests (MIIBTQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm size</td>
<td>log(assets(ATQ)), where assets are deflated by the GDP deflator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>Operating income before depreciation (OIBDPQ) / assets (ATQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-to-Book ratio</td>
<td>Market value of equity (MEQ) / book value of equity (BEQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td>Net property plant and equipment (PPENTQ) / asset (ATQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttentionToMacro</td>
<td>Author calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttentionToFirm</td>
<td>Author calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttentionCapacity</td>
<td>(AttentionToMacro + FirmAttention) * 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttentionAllocation</td>
<td>(AttentionToMacro * 100 / AttentionCapacity) * 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The capitalized abbreviations in parenthesis follow the Compustat mnemonics when not otherwise defined. The definition of the leverage follow Welch (2011) and his website (the part of Notes on Debt Rations). In Compustat raw data; I treat negative DLC as a missing value (na). These firm characteristics are commonly used in corporate finance literature.

Table 5: Variable Definition and Transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leverage(book)</td>
<td>FD¹/BEQ²</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage(market)</td>
<td>FD/MEQ</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Size</td>
<td>log(bookassets³)</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-to-Book</td>
<td>MEQ/BEQ</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>33.76</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>ATM times 100</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>ATF times 100</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttentionCapacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttentionAllocation</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.42</td>
<td>21.15</td>
<td>48.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ FD stands for Financial Debt  
² BEQ is the book value of equity = stockholder's equity + noncontrolling  
³ deflated with GDP deflator
3.2 Variance Decomposition

To find the dominance of the firm-level leverage changes, I decompose the variation in leverage changes into its common (aggregate), industrial and idiosyncratic components using the panel variance decomposition methods\(^\text{21}\). The variance decomposition follows a two-stage panel regression strategy. At the first stage, the aggregate component is uncovered by regressing the market leverage ratio (or leverage ratio growth rate) on time dummies and clustering standard errors at the firm level. At the second stage, the regression takes the residual series from the first stage and regresses on the interaction of time dummies and sector dummies. From the second stage, the residual series are separated into a sector (SIC division) component and an idiosyncratic component. The result shows that the idiosyncratic component is the most volatile. The relative standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component (0.20) is 5 times larger than that of the aggregate component (0.04) and 6.7 times larger than that of the sector-specific component (0.03). It further suggests that the aggregate component and the sector-specific component play a similar role. The literature agrees that industry characteristics can play an important role in explaining corporate leverage. This gives me the guidance in designing the role of macroeconomy and sector in the empirical analysis.

I applied the same variance decomposition exercise with the manager’s attention towards macro conditions. The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component (0.005) is 5.5 times that of aggregated component (0.0009), and is 10 times than sector component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: The Managerial Attention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market to Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage(market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage(book)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table presents correlation. All values are significant at 1% level.*

\(^{21}\) It was proposed by Carlsson and Skans (2012) and then used in Meyer et al. (2021). Lemmon et al. (2008) made a similar decomposition for firm-level leverage ratio change.
The manager’s attention capacity is counter-cyclical and size-dependent. Larger firms have more financial capacity to afford more information towards both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic shocks. The counter-cyclical pattern in the managers’ attention capacity is mainly driven by their attention towards macroeconomics. The Coronavirus pandemic triggers more attention towards macroeconomics than the 2008 Financial Crisis. There is no cyclical pattern on attention towards idiosyncratic shocks. The Coronavirus pandemic brings more common shocks than idiosyncratic shocks. It could be that firms with higher exposure to macroeconomics will tend to pay more attention to macroeconomics.

3.3 C-Suite’s Attention as a Factor of Leverage Dynamics

The variations and dynamics in a firm’s leverage ratio have not been well explained (Graham and Leary, 2011). This section aims at introducing managers’ attention capacity and attention allocation as two important factors in a firm’s leverage ratio.

\[
\text{leverage}_{i,t} = \delta_i + \delta_t + \alpha_1 \times \text{AttentionCapacity}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \times \text{AttentionAllocation}_{i,t} + \gamma \times Z_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]

(9)

where \(\text{leverage}_{i,t}\) is market leverage, and \(\delta_i\) and \(\delta_t\) are firm fixed effect and time fixed effect. \(Z_{i,t}\) is a vector of control variables, including firm size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, and tangibility.

Table 7 presents the regression result using the firm-level panel data. I would like to highlight two findings. First, at the firm level attention capacity has a significantly positive effect on the market leverage ratio. Second, attention allocation towards macroeconomics has a significantly negative effect on the manager’s leverage decisions. Both results hold even after controlling for firm characteristics, time, and firm fixed effects, comparing columns (4) and (6). By including attention capacity and attention allocation, I obtain the regression with the best adjusted R-square, shown in column (6). My result is still robust and significant after considering the business cycle, measured by the real GDP growth rate and VIX.

The results suggest that a manager’s attention towards macroeconomics has both substitution and scale effects on the leverage ratio. When a manager pays attention to macroeconomics, the attention capacity increases, motivating more information collection. Higher information volume will help a manager make better decisions (scale effect). At
the same time, paying attention to macroeconomics may distract a manager from focusing on other issues that are important for the firm.
Table 7: Panel Regression, Leverage and Manager’s Attention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>1.69***</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
<td>1.93***</td>
<td>2.79***</td>
<td>2.09***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>-5.53***</td>
<td>-6.39***</td>
<td>-6.11***</td>
<td>-4.06***</td>
<td>-4.77***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>4.29***</td>
<td>4.34***</td>
<td>5.93***</td>
<td>6.07***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>-64.1***</td>
<td>-62.5***</td>
<td>-69.5***</td>
<td>-67.9***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-to-Book Value</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td>23.8***</td>
<td>23.9***</td>
<td>30.0***</td>
<td>28.7***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.3***</td>
<td>17.4***</td>
<td>22.0***</td>
<td>20.1***</td>
<td>-24.7***</td>
<td>-24.4***</td>
<td>-42.2***</td>
<td>-46.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>124617</td>
<td>124617</td>
<td>124617</td>
<td>124617</td>
<td>120444</td>
<td>120444</td>
<td>120444</td>
<td>120444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** represents $p < 0.01$. I present the coefficient of market-to-book Value as 100 times the original values. The attention allocation is in decimal format instead of percentage for coefficient presentation purpose.
The interaction of macro news versus micro news, and how it affects an agent’s decision, has not yet been developed in the corporate finance field. In recent investor behavior literature, Peng and Xiong (2006) propose that investors see the macro news and firm-level news as substitutes, and they process macro and sector news first, then turn to firm-specific information. Hirshleifer and Sheng (2021) also find that macro news and micro news can be complementary.

### 3.4 C-Suite’s Attention as an Amplifier of Business Cycles

It is well researched that the economic state affects the firm-level leverage ratio. However, the channels through which the business cycle transmits to a firm’s capital structure are still underdeveloped. I demonstrate that executive managers’ attention can amplify the effect of the business cycle on a firm’s financial decisions. To uncover this relationship, I add interaction terms of attention capacity times real GDP growth rate and attention allocation times real GDP growth rate into the baseline Equation (9).

\[
\text{leverage}_{i,t} = \delta_i + \alpha_1 \times \text{AttentionCapacity}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \times \text{AttentionAllocation}_{i,t} + \\
\beta_1 \times \text{realGDPgrowthrate}_t + \beta_2 \times \text{realGDPgrowthrate}_t \times \\
\text{AttentionCapacity}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \times \text{realGDPgrowthrate}_t \times \text{AttentionAllocation}_{i,t} \\
+ \gamma \times Z_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]  

(10)

where \(\text{leverage}_{i,t}\) is market leverage, and \(\delta_i\) is the firm fixed effect. \(Z_{i,t}\) is a vector of control variables, including firm size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, and tangibility.

In Table 8, column (3) shows the interaction term of attention capacity and real GDP growth rate is negative. It suggests that when the real GDP growth rate is negative, the firm-level leverage increases, and more than half of the effect work through the attention capacity channel. When executive managers have rising awareness of the uncertainties, they tend to take actions to offset them. Here, the action is to increase the leverage ratio to cope with economic downturns. This acts as the amplifier of business cycles. Column (4) shows that the interaction term of attention allocation and real GDP growth rate is positive. It suggests that when the real GDP growth rate is negative, paying attention to macroeconomics can distract managers who need to evaluate what is a proper leverage ratio that includes rising credit risk. Managers may downplay the effect of firm-specific conditions and choose to lower the leverage ratio.
Table 8: Panel Regression, Manager’s Attention as An Amplifier of the Business Cycle on Leverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>2.09***</td>
<td>1.24***</td>
<td>2.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>-4.77***</td>
<td>-4.70***</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>6.07***</td>
<td>6.07***</td>
<td>6.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>-67.9***</td>
<td>-67.9***</td>
<td>-67.7***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-to-Book</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td>28.7***</td>
<td>28.7***</td>
<td>28.8***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIX</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity x VIX</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-46.5***</td>
<td>-45.4***</td>
<td>-48.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>120444</td>
<td>120444</td>
<td>120444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$. I present the coefficient of market-to-book value as 100 times the original values. The attention allocation is in decimal format instead of percentage for coefficient presentation purpose.

3.4 Robustness Checks

I apply a series of robustness checks in this section to investigate the heterogeneity in the firm-level leverages and whether executive managers’ attention plays a major role in all of them. The first comes with the liquidity supply faced by individual firms. The second part includes the studies of cyclical industries and non-cyclical industries.
3.5.1 Role of Financial Constraints

To categorize firms into financially constrained and financially non-constrained groups, I look at whether a firm has access to the public debt market. Specifically, I use the bond rating from S&P 500\textsuperscript{22}. I then merge the data with the accounting data from Compustat using the firm's stock ticker, resulting in 114923 observations. I first add a term $liquidity$ into Equation (9) and then run the same regression with the financially constrained group as well as the financially unconstrained group separately. The term $liquidity$ is a dummy variable. $liquidity$ equals 1 when a firm has access to the public debt market. Otherwise, it equals 0. Table 9 presents the results and they are robust across the whole sample and groups with different liquidity.

Column (2) shows that with better liquidity, a firm chooses to have a higher leverage ratio. To further compare the financially constrained and unconstrained group, I separate the sample firms into two groups and present the exercise results in columns (3) and (4) separately. While it yields a robust result, the coefficients also show that financially unconstrained firms are more affected by attention allocation more. Financially constrained firms are more affected by attention capacity more.

\textsuperscript{22}The data are fetched from the WRDS Bond Returns database. I choose the rating from S&P 500 instead of Moody's and Fitch, because of data availability.
Table 9: Manager’s Attention to Firm-level Leverage, Considering Liquidity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) All Samples</th>
<th>(3) Financially non-Constrain</th>
<th>(4) Financially Constraint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>1.94***</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
<td>1.92***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>−5.69***</td>
<td>−6.72***</td>
<td>−5.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>4.34***</td>
<td>3.68***</td>
<td>3.93***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>−59.2***</td>
<td>−127.5***</td>
<td>−49.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market to Book Value</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td>23.4***</td>
<td>22.7***</td>
<td>23.0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−24.7***</td>
<td>−12.9***</td>
<td>−21.8***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>114923</td>
<td>20585</td>
<td>94152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates $pvalue < 0.01$. I present the coefficient of market-to-book value as 100 times the original values. The attention allocation is in decimal format instead of percentage for coefficient presentation purpose.

3.5.2 Cyclical vs Non-cyclical Industry

Empirical results in Section 3 document that both managerial attention capacity and attention allocation follow a counter-cyclical pattern. To investigate the heterogeneity of cyclical sensitivity, I introduce a binary variable “cyclical” in the empirical study. For the eleven sectors recognized in Table A.1, I assign Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, and Retail Trade as cyclical sensitive sectors. Other sectors are not cyclically sensitive sectors. When a firm is more cyclically sensitive, the managers pay more attention to macroeconomics.

---

\[^{23}\]This categorization is based on Berman and Pfleeger (1997).
Table 10: Manager’s Attention to Firm-level Leverage, Considering Cyclical Sensitivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>2.79***</td>
<td>3.06***</td>
<td>2.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>-4.06***</td>
<td>-4.73***</td>
<td>-2.96***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Size</td>
<td>5.93***</td>
<td>6.52***</td>
<td>5.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>-69.5***</td>
<td>-65.9***</td>
<td>-80.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-to-Book Value</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility</td>
<td>30.0***</td>
<td>32.9***</td>
<td>26.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-42.2***</td>
<td>-48.4***</td>
<td>-32.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Fixed Effect</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Fixed Effect</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclical Sensitive</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>120444</td>
<td>77481</td>
<td>42963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates $p-value < 0.01$. I present the coefficient of market-to-book value as 100 times the original values. The attention allocation is in decimal format instead of percentage for coefficient presentation purpose.

In Table 10, columns (2) and (3) present the empirical exercise in Equation (9) for the whole sample, the cyclically sensitive industries and cyclically insensitive industries. Both scale effect and substitute effects are robust. Comparing results of cyclically sensitive industries (column (2)) and cyclically insensitive industries (column (3)), managerial attention has greater effects on the leverage ratio for cyclically sensitive industries.

4. Theoretical Model

The empirical results from Section 3 and section 4 indicate that managerial information rigidity has non-trivial quantitative implications in financing decisions. To address the impact of information rigidity on a manager’s financial decision, I introduce rational inattention (henceforth RI) into a contingent claims model with an optimal static capital
structure. Following the established “noisy information model” proposed by Sims (2003, 2006, 2010), I assume that for a representative firm, the manager’s attention capacity and attention allocation are endogenous. RI has been well developed in macroeconomics and financial investment. Embedding RI in corporate finance is quite a challenge mainly due to, in my opinion, the different statistics assumptions and the modeling complications in capital structure models.

To merge the frameworks of RI and corporate finance, I first keep the assumption in baseline corporate finance model that the cash flow follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). This is the fundamental difference from the popular AR(1) assumption of shocks in RI. To keep the linear function of state variable, I assume that the cash flow consists of two independent components: macro and firm-specific components. To make this integration attempt straightforward, I apply an optimal static capital structure model under the contingent claims paradigm. The advantage of using this model provide two advantages. First, one can simply apply comparative statics to yield the differences between firm’s decisions with perfect attention and with rational inattention. Second, I can examine the difference between liquidity default (financial constrained firms) and optimal default (financial unconstrained firms) two scenarios. Section 5.1 mainly constructs the framework of optimal static capital structure with standard. For readers that are familiar with these model can jump to section 5.2. I introduce a new information decision process for managers. A manager’s financing decision is setup into two steps. At the beginning of the period, the manager makes optimal information decision according to the information she gained from last period. In this step, the manager chooses attention capacity and allocate attention. At the end of the period, the manager makes optimal financing decisions using the attention capacity and attention allocation decisions made from step 1.

4.1 Optimal Static Capital Structure

In this section, I introduce the standard optimal static capital structure framework with contingent claim paradigm. This setup serves the second step of a manager’s decision. As in the classic real options investment model, a representative firm generate cash flow $X$ at time $t$ from the assets owned by the firm. I suppose the cash flow $X$ consists of macro and firm-specific components with a linear function:

$$X_t = logm_t + logf_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

where $m_t$ represents the aggregate component of cash flows and $f_t$ represents the firm-specific component of cash flows. Both components are stochastic GBMs and satisfy the
following stochastic differential Equations (SDEs):

\[ dm_t = \mu_m m_t dt + \sigma_m m_t dW^m_t, \]  
(12)

\[ df_t = \mu_f f_t dt + \sigma_f f_t dW^f_t. \]  
(13)

where \( \mu_m \) and \( \mu_f \) are constant percentage drifts. \( \sigma_m \) and \( \sigma_f \) are constant percentage volatility. The drift terms are to model deterministic trends, while the volatility terms are to model a set of unpredictable events occurring during the motion. \( W^m_t \) and \( W^f_t \) are independent Brownian motions.

Given the arbitrary initial value \( m_0 \) and \( f_0 \), the above SDEs have analytic solutions (under the Ito’s interpretation):

\[ m_t = m_0 \exp((\mu_m - \frac{\sigma^2_m}{2})t + \sigma_m W^m_t) \]  
(14)

\[ f_t = f_0 \exp((\mu_f - \frac{\sigma^2_f}{2})t + \sigma_f W^f_t) \]  
(15)

where \( m_0 \) and \( f_0 \) are the initial values of \( m_t \) and \( f_t \). By writing it with a natural Lagrangian format, \( m_t \) and \( f_t \) can transform to:

\[ \log m_t = \log m_0 + (\mu_m - \frac{\sigma^2_m}{2})t + \sigma_m W^m_t \]  
(16)

\[ \log f_t = \log f_0 + (\mu_f - \frac{\sigma^2_f}{2})t + \sigma_f W^f_t \]  
(17)

where \( \log m_t \sim N(\log m_0 + (\mu_m - \frac{\sigma^2_m}{2})t, \sigma_m^2 t) \), and \( \log f_t \sim N(\log f_0 + (\mu_f - \frac{\sigma^2_f}{2})t, \sigma_f^2 t) \). Combining the macro and the firm-specific components, I write the cash flow of the firm as:

\[ X_t = \log m_t + \log f_t = \log(X_0) + (\mu_x - \frac{\sigma^2_x}{2})t + \sigma_x W^x_t \]  
(18)

The distribution of \( X_t \) can be derived accordingly: \( N(\log(X_0) + (\mu_x - \frac{\sigma^2_x}{2})t, \sigma_x^2 t) \).

I assume a firm’s investment and financing decision are independent, so that cash flows are not affected by investment nor operating costs. The cash flow \( X_t \) then is equivalent to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). Assuming perpetuity cash flows, I calculate

\[ X_0 = m_0 f_0, \sigma_x = \sqrt{\sigma_m^2 + \sigma_f^2}, \mu_x = \mu_m + \mu_f. \]  
See the calculation in Appendix B.
the equity value of an unleveraged firm at any time \( t \) as discounted cash flows after taxes:

\[
S_t = \frac{(1 - \tau)X_t}{r - \mu_x}
\]

(19)

where \( \tau \) is the tax rate charged as a fraction of a firm’s EBIT. No income tax is considered.

Consistent with the trade-off theory, issuing corporate debt provides a “tax shield” to the company. The interest payments are considered as expenses that are excluded from the taxation. I assume a simple payments perpetual debt with a constant coupon flow \( c \). The total gain from the tax benefits to debt thus is \( \frac{\tau c}{r - \mu_x} \). The cost of issuing corporate debt is the default. I assume two different types of default plan: optimal default and liquidity default. The are also known as endogenous default and exogenous default. These two different default options represent two categories of firms that I would like to focus on in this paper: the firms without financial constraints and firms with financial constraints. This setup provides a natural comparison of the effect of limited attention and liquidity constraint and hence addresses the question of the degree of impact from attention side.

Because \( X_t \) is the only state variable, the two default options indicate different default thresholds, denoted as \( X_D \). In the case of liquidity default, the company choose the default threshold \( X_D = c \). In the case of optimal default, the company choose a threshold \( X_D < c \). In both scenarios, the companies choose to default when the cash flow reaches the threshold the first time from above. The managers determine the default threshold to maximize the equity value. The effective assumption here is that the equity holders have “deep pockets,” meaning they can find other sources to provide liquidity to cover the coupon payments. In this case \( X_D < c \). In the case of liquidity default, the default occurs when \( X_t \) becomes sufficiently low. I interpret this default time as the default threshold \( X_D \) equals the coupon payment \( c \).

Considering an Arrow–Debreu claim at any time before the time of default, the value of the default as an option is:

\[
A(X_t, X_D) = \left( \frac{X_t}{X_D} \right)^{\xi_1}
\]

(20)

where \( \xi_1 \) is the negative root of the fundamental quadratic equation:

\[
\xi_1 = -\frac{1}{\sigma_x^2} \left( \mu_x - \frac{\sigma_x^2}{2} \right) + \sqrt{\left( \mu_x - \frac{\sigma_x^2}{2} \right)^2 + 2\sigma_x^2 r}
\]

(21)

For any date prior to default, the value of levered equity can be written as:
\[ S(X_t) = \left( \frac{X_t}{r - \mu_x} - \frac{c}{r} \right) (1 - \tau) + A(X_t, X_D) \left( \frac{-X_D}{r - \mu_x} + \frac{c}{r} \right)(1 - \tau) \]  \hspace{1cm} (22)

where in the equation, the first term \( \left( \frac{X_t}{r - \mu_x} - \frac{c}{r} \right)(1 - \tau) \) represents the after-tax levered equity value in perpetuity when default does not happen. The second term \( A(X_t, X_D) \left( \frac{-X_D}{r - \mu_x} + \frac{c}{r} \right)(1 - \tau) \) considers the scenario of default, when shareholders give up future cash flows in exchange for discontinuing interest payments. To find the optimal level of \( X_D \), we apply the smooth-pasting condition:

\[ \frac{\partial S(X_t)}{\partial X_t} \bigg|_{X_t=X_D} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (23)

By solving the condition equation, the optimal default boundary is:

\[ X_D = \frac{\xi_1}{\xi_1 - 1} \frac{r - \mu_x}{r} c \]  \hspace{1cm} (24)

Denote \( \gamma_D = \frac{\xi_1}{\xi_1 - 1} \frac{r - \mu_x}{r} \), thus \( X_D = \gamma_D c \). One can easily prove that \( \xi_1 < 0 \) and \( \gamma_D < 1 \). This indicates that with the default option, the manager chooses to keep the firm running with the cash flow less than the coupon payment \( c \). The manager needs to find other financial sources to avoid default. Thus, one can interpret \( \gamma_D = 1 \) as the liquidation default case.

Given coupon \( c \) and default threshold \( X_D \), the value of debt which applies liquidation in the case of default, is:

\[ D(X_t) = \frac{c}{r} - A(X_t, X_D) \frac{c}{r} + A(X_t, X_D) (1 - \alpha) (1 - \tau) \frac{X_D}{r - \mu} \]  \hspace{1cm} (25)

To interpret this equation, I suppose the first term \( \frac{c}{r} - A(X_t, X_D) \frac{c}{r} \) as the perpetuity value of risk-free debt. The second term \( A(X_t, X_D) (1 - \alpha) (1 - \tau) \frac{X_D}{r - \mu} \) is the percent value of interest payments that the debt-holders lose when the firm chooses to default. The last term represents the present value of assets that debt-holders recover in liquidation.

Under the framework of a static capital structure environment, the decision to issue debt is made only once, which is at date 0. Shareholders consider maximizing the total value of future equity and debt. Because this is a decision about committing ex ante to maximizing the firm value, shareholders will internalize the value of future debt-holders’ claims. Thus, I define the firm value at date 0 as the sum of equity value at date 0 and the debt value at date 0: \( V(X_0) = S(X_0) + D(X_0) \). Considering Equations (22) and (25),
I can rewrite the firm value at date 0 as:

$$V(X_0) = \left( \frac{X_0}{r - \mu_x} - \frac{c}{r} \right) (1 - \tau) + A(X_0, X_D) \left( \frac{X_D}{r - \mu_x} + \frac{c}{r} \right) (1 - \tau) + \frac{c}{r} - A(X_0, X_D) \frac{c}{r} + A(X_0, X_D) (1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau) \frac{X_D}{r - \mu}$$

(26)

To decide a financial structure aiming at maximizing the firm value, the shareholders need to choose an optimal coupon $c$:

$$\frac{\partial V(X_0)}{\partial c} = 0$$

(27)

Solving this equation, the optimal coupon payment is:

$$c^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \xi} \left( \frac{\tau}{\alpha \gamma (r - \mu_x) + \tau} \right) \right]^{1/\xi} X_0$$

(28)

Both empirical and theoretical research tend to use financial leverage rate upon cross-firm comparison because the coupon rate is related to the firm size and not interpreted as a main proxy for financial policy.

I apply quasi-market leverage ratio:

$$QML(X_t) = \frac{D(X_0)}{D(X_0) + S(X_t)}$$

(29)

### 4.2 Introducing Managerial Information Rigidity

Now I turn to managerial information decisions. At the beginning of each period $t$, managers make the optimal information decision by deciding the attention capacity and attention allocation. Recall that Equations (16) and (17) are the real processes of cash flow’s macroeconomic and firm-specific components. Following information rigidity pioneered by [Sims (2003)], I assume managers observe the macroeconomic and the firm-specific components with noise. Suppose $s_{m,t}$ ($s_{f,t}$) is the observed macroeconomic (firm-specific) component at time $t$ about $t + 1$ dynamics:

$$s_{m,t} = \text{log}m_{t+1} + \epsilon_{m,t}$$

(30)
\[ s_{f,t} = \log f_{t+1} + \epsilon_{f,t} \]  

where \( \epsilon_{m,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \eta_{m,t}^2) \), and \( \epsilon_{f,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \eta_{f,t}^2) \) are iid idiosyncratic shock and are independent from the fundamental shocks \((m_{t+1}, f_{t+1})\) hitting the economy. When a manager allocate more attention to a factor, the signal of that factor becomes more precise. \( \epsilon_{m,t} \) and \( \epsilon_{f,t} \) are endogenous noise determined by managerial finite attention capacity and attention allocation.

Both the macro component process \( \log m_{t+1} \) and the noise follow Gaussian distribution; the joint distribution \( s_{m,t} \) also follows Gaussian distribution \( \mathcal{N}(\log m_0 + (\mu_m - \sigma_m^2/2)t, \sigma_m^2(t + 1) + \eta_{m,t}^2) \). Similarly, the noisy signal for the firm component \( s_{f,t} \), a manager can update a belief about the cash flow according to the Bayes rule. The manager forms a posterior belief with the conditional distribution of the macro component \( m_{t+1} | s_{m,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{m}_t, \hat{\omega}_{m,t}^2) \), and the firm-specific component \( f_{t+1} | s_{f,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{f}_t, \hat{\omega}_{f,t}^2) \), where \( \hat{m}_t \) and \( \hat{f}_t \) are the conditional mean, and \( \hat{\omega}_{m,t}^2 \) and \( \hat{\omega}_{f,t}^2 \) are the conditional variance. According to the Bayes rule:

\[
\frac{1}{\hat{\omega}_{m,t}^2} = \frac{1}{\sigma_m^2(t + 1)} + \frac{1}{\eta_{m,t}^2} \quad \text{(32)}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{\hat{\omega}_{f,t}^2} = \frac{1}{\sigma_f^2(t + 1)} + \frac{1}{\eta_{f,t}^2} \quad \text{(33)}
\]

Recall the entropy of unconditional \( m_{t+1} \) is:

\[
\mathcal{H}(m_{t+1}) = \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2\pi e \sigma_m^2(t + 1)) \quad \text{(34)}
\]

The entropy of conditional \( m_{t+1} | s_{m,t} \) is:

\[
\mathcal{H}(m_{t+1} | s_{m,t}) = \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2\pi e \hat{\omega}_{m,t}^2) \quad \text{(35)}
\]

Thus, the amount of information contained in \( s_{m,t} \) about \( m_{t+1} \) can be expressed by the reduction in the entropy of \( m_{t+1} \) after acknowledging \( s_{m,t} \):

\[
I(m_{t+1}; s_{m,t}) \equiv \mathcal{H}(m_{t+1}) - \mathcal{H}(m_{t+1} | s_{m,t}) = \frac{1}{2} \log(\sigma_m^2(t + 1)/\hat{\omega}_{m,t}^2) = \lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t \quad \text{(36)}
\]

Similarly, the amount of information contained in \( s_{f,t} \) about \( f_{t+1} \) can be expressed by the reduction in the entropy of \( f_{t+1} \) after acknowledging \( s_{f,t} \):

\[
I(f_{t+1}; s_{f,t}) \equiv \mathcal{H}(f_{t+1}) - \mathcal{H}(f_{t+1} | s_{f,t}) = \frac{1}{2} \log(\sigma_f^2(t + 1)/\hat{\omega}_{f,t}^2) = \lambda_{f,t} \kappa_t \quad \text{(37)}
\]
where $\kappa_t$ is the manager’s information channel capacity (also called as attention capacity in Section 3 and 4). $\kappa_t$ also imposes an upper bound on the manager’s information flow, which is defined as the uncertainty reduction of the mutual entropy of historical information and new information. From Equations (31) and (35), the perceived variances of the macro component and the firm-specific component noises are:

$$
\eta^2_{m,t} = \frac{\sigma^2_m(t + 1)}{e^{\lambda_m t \kappa_t} - 1} \quad (38)
$$

$$
\eta^2_{f,t} = \frac{\sigma^2_f(t + 1)}{e^{\lambda_f t \kappa_t} - 1} \quad (39)
$$

Inspired by the empirical results, I assume the information capacity $\kappa_t$ is variant instead of constant. As I assume the macro and firm-specific components of the managerial information decision of macro and firm-specific components are independent,

$$
I(X_{t+1}; s_{x,t}) = I(m_{t+1}; s_{m,t}) + I(m_{t+1}; s_{m,t}) \leq \kappa_t \quad (40)
$$

$$
\lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t + \lambda_{f,t} \kappa_t \leq \kappa_t \quad (41)
$$

$$
\lambda_{m,t} + \lambda_{f,t} \leq 1 \quad (42)
$$

After acquiring the noise signal, the manager updates his belief of the macro component $\log m_{t+1}$ based on the Bayes rule with mean and variance of belief as:

$$
\hat{m}_{t} = \bar{m}_{t} + (1 - e^{-\lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t})(s_{m,t} - \bar{m}_{t})^{25} \quad (43)
$$

$$
\hat{\omega}^2_{m,t} = \sigma^2_m(t + 1)e^{-\lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t} \quad (44)
$$

where $(1 - e^{-\lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t})$ is the responsiveness of $\hat{m}_{t}$ to the signal, increases with both attention allocation rate $\lambda_{m,t}$ and attention capacity $\kappa_t$. Similar distribution can be found with the firm-specific component:

$$
\hat{f}_{t} = \bar{f}_{t} + (1 - e^{-\lambda_{f,t} \kappa_t})(s_{f,t} - \bar{f}_{t})^{26} \quad (45)
$$

$$
\hat{\omega}^2_{f,t} = \sigma^2_f(t + 1)e^{-\lambda_{f,t} \kappa_t} \quad (46)
$$

4.3 Manager’s Information Decision

---

$^{25} \bar{m}_{t} = \log m_{0} + (\mu_{m} - \sigma^2_m) t$  

$^{26} \bar{f}_{t} = \log f_{0} + (\mu_{f} - \sigma^2_f) t$
To make an efficient inter-temporal financing decision, the manager must determine the attention capacity first, then the attention allocation to factors that can affect the decision. I assume the attention capacity as a function of the cash flow standard deviation:

$$\kappa_t = \kappa_0 + \theta \log(\sigma_{x,t})$$  \hspace{1cm} (47)

where $\kappa_0 > 0$ and $0 < \theta < 1$ adjusts the relative scale. $\kappa_0 > 0$ because intuitively, a manager should always be attentive to cash flow dynamic. $0 < \theta < 1$ because the attention capacity should also increases as cash flow variance increases, while the slope decreases.

The objective of a manager’s information decision is to minimize the variance of his belief about each period’s cash flow.

$$V_t = \min_{\lambda_{m,t}, \lambda_{f,t}} Var_t(X_{t+1}|s_{m,t}, s_{f,t}) = \min_{\lambda_{m,t}, \lambda_{f,t}} \sigma^2_m(t+1)e^{-\lambda_{m,t}\kappa_t} + \sigma^2_f(t+1)e^{-\lambda_{f,t}\kappa_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (48)

The manager’s information decisions can be further transformed problem into

$$V_t = \min_{\lambda_{m,t}, \lambda_{f,t}} \sigma^2_m(t+1)e^{-\lambda_{m,t}\kappa_t} + \sigma^2_f(t+1)e^{-\lambda_{f,t}\kappa_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (49)

with three constraints:

$$\lambda_{m,t} + \lambda_{f,t} \leq 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (50)

$$0 \leq \lambda_{m,t} \leq 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (51)

$$0 \leq \lambda_{f,t} \leq 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (52)

Solving Equation (49) and (50) with Lagrange multiplier gives:

$$\lambda_{m,t} - \lambda_{f,t} = \frac{2}{\kappa_t} \log\left(\frac{\sigma_{m,t}}{\sigma_{f,t}}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (53)

$$\lambda_{m,t} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{\kappa_t} \log\left(\frac{\sigma_{m,t}}{\sigma_{f,t}}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (54)

$$\lambda_{f,t} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{\kappa_t} \log\left(\frac{\sigma_{m,t}}{\sigma_{f,t}}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (55)

This result indicates that a manager’s attention allocation depends on the relative size of the standard deviation between the macro component and firm-specific component. A manager’s attention allocation towards one component is positively correlated with the component’s own variance. When the variance of the macro component increases, the manager increases the attention allocated to macroeconomics.
Meanwhile, equations (51)-(52) and (54)-(55) provide the binding of attention capacity via providing the constraints on the volatility. When $\sigma_m$ and $\sigma_f$ are constrained by maximum values $\sigma_m^{\text{max}}$ or $\sigma_f^{\text{max}}$, the attention capacity $\kappa_t$ has a maximum.

The manager’s financing decision in the rise of macro volatility is a major concern in this paper. When macroeconomic volatility $\sigma_m^2$ increases while keeping the volatility of firm-specific component $\sigma_f^2$ constant, a manager’s attention capacity $\kappa_t$ first increases. The manager’s attention to macroeconomic and firm-specific components can be described as:

$$\text{AttentionToMacro}(ATM_t) = \lambda_{m,t} \times \kappa_t = \frac{1}{2} \kappa_t + \log \frac{\sigma_m}{\sigma_f}$$ (56)

$$\text{AttentionToFirm}(ATF_t) = \lambda_{f,t} \times \kappa_t = \frac{1}{2} \kappa_t - \log \frac{\sigma_m}{\sigma_f}$$ (57)

where $\frac{1}{2} \kappa_t$ represents the scale effect and $\log \frac{\sigma_m}{\sigma_f}$ represents the substitute effect. As a result, a manager’s attention to macroeconomics certainly increases, while the attention to firm-specific component remains uncertain. Both the first term $\frac{1}{2} \kappa_t$ and the second term $\log \frac{\sigma_m}{\sigma_f}$ increase, and which term increase more requires further analysis. Taking the first derivative of $ATF_t$ in response to $\sigma_m$ yields:

$$\frac{\partial ATF_t}{\partial \sigma_m} = \frac{(\theta - 1)\sigma_m^2 - \sigma_f^2}{\sigma_m (\sigma_m^2 + \sigma_f^2)}$$ (58)

As $0 < \theta < 1$, $\frac{\partial ATF_t}{\partial \sigma_m} < 0$, suggesting that the substitution effect is always larger than the scale effect.

### 4.4 Manager’s Financing Decision Under Information Friction: Comparative Statics

A manager’s posterior belief with the conditional distribution of the cash flow $X_{t+1} | s_{m,t}, s_{f,t} \sim N(\hat{X}_t, \hat{\omega}_{x,t}^2)$. Because the macro component and firm-specific components are independent,

$$\hat{X}_t = \hat{m}_t + \hat{f}_t$$

$$= \bar{m}_t + \bar{f}_t + (1 - e^{-\lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t})(s_{m,t} - \bar{m}_t) + (1 - e^{-\lambda_{f,t} \kappa_t})(s_{f,t} - \bar{f}_t)$$

$$= \bar{X}_t + (1 - e^{-\lambda_{m,t} \kappa_t})(s_{m,t} - \bar{m}_t) + (1 - e^{-\lambda_{f,t} \kappa_t})(s_{f,t} - \bar{f}_t)$$ (59)

\[\text{See Appendix B for math details.}\]

\[\text{28} \bar{X}_t = \log X_0 + (\mu_x - \frac{\sigma_x^2}{2})t\]
\[ \omega_{x,t}^2 = \sigma_m^2(t + 1) e^{-\lambda_m t} + \sigma_f^2(t + 1) e^{-\lambda_f t} \]  

(60)

Recall that in Section 5.1, Equation (28) indicates the coupon payment under perfect information, where the unconditional distribution of \( X_{t+1} \): \( N(\log(X_0) + (\mu_x - \sigma_x^2)(t + 1), \sigma_x^2(t + 1)) \). Equation (21) indicates that \( \xi_1 \) is a function of cash flow's mean and variance. The conditional distribution of the cash flow indicates a lower variance than the unconditional case. However, the relative size of the conditional mean versus the unconditional mean is uncertain.

When considering the information friction, the dynamics of the optimal coupon payment becomes too complicated. It is not easy or straightforward to provide an analytical analysis. I use a comparative statics to demonstrate the dynamics. Figure 3 illustrates the comparative statics of managerial attention capacity and attention allocation. Equations (47), (52) and (53) indicates that the volatility of both macro and firm-specific components can determine a manager's attention capacity and allocation; I examine both components in Figure 4. The \( x \) axis represents for the volatility of the macro component, and the four line plots in each graph shows different levels of volatility of firm-specific components.

Figure 5 presents the comparative statics of the optimal static capital structure model under no attention (classic attention) and limited attention. The dotted blue line and the grey line present the leverage dynamics under an optimal static capital structure model without an information decision. The red and orange lines show the leverage dynamics with the information decision process. First, with attention consideration, the optimal leverage ratio is higher than the case without attention consideration for all volatility levels of the macroeconomic component.

\[ X_0 = m_0 f_0, \sigma_x = \sqrt{\sigma_m^2 + \sigma_f^2}, \mu_x = \mu_m + \mu_f \]
Figure 4: Optimal static capital structure model. Comparative statics with respect to Macro volatility

Note: This figure shows manager’s attention capacity $\kappa$, attention allocation rate to macroeconomic and firm-specific conditions. The benchmark set of parameters is: $k_0 = 0.8$ and $\theta = 0.5$. 
Figure 5: Optimal Static Capital Structure Model. Comparative Statics with Respect to Macro Volatility

Note: This figure shows the comparative statics of the optimal coupon rate, $c$, the default boundary, $X_D$, optimal leverage, $L$, and the difference in values between levered and unlevered firms, $\frac{V-F}{F}$, all with respect to macroeconomic volatility, $\sigma_m$, in the optimal static capital structure model. The benchmark set of parameters is: $r = 0.05$, $\mu = 0.02$, $\sigma = 0.25$, $\tau = 0.2$, $X_0 = 1$ and $\alpha = 0.1$, $\sigma_m = 0.2$, $\sigma_f = 0.3$, $\eta_m = 1$, $\eta_f = 1$. 
5. Conclusion

Managers are confronted with stimuli from both macroeconomic and firm-specific issues. To introduce managerial efforts of learning about the environment into financing decision making process, I quantify managerial limited attention with attention capacity and attention allocation. Using the new measurements, I demonstrate that firm characteristics and the business cycle can affect the dynamics of managerial attention capacity and allocation.

Using publicly listed firms’ quarterly earnings call transcript and NLP, I first quantify managerial attention capacity and attention allocation. I have three findings regarding managerial attention: First, attention capacity and allocation are related to firm characteristics. Large firm size, high profitability, access to the credit market, and growth opportunities will make the managers expand attention capacity and allocate more attention to macroeconomics. Second, both attention capacity and attention allocation are counter-cyclical. They increase during a recession mainly due to increasingly salient macroeconomic information. Third, on average, managers allocate more than half of their attention towards macroeconomics.

I also look into the role of managerial attention in explaining the unprecedented high level of business leverage. Attention capacity is stimulated from the surrounding’s uncertainty. Both macroeconomic and firm-specific components play a central role in this process. To simplify the analysis, I assume the firm-specific volatility remain constant while allow the macroeconomic volatility variant. The results show that paying attention to macroeconomics provides both substitution and scale effects. Paying attention to macroeconomics concurs with attention capacity, which significantly increases a firm’s leverage ratio by 1.69. Meanwhile, paying more attention to macroeconomics coincides with higher attention allocation towards macroeconomics, supplanting attention paid to firm-specific issues. This, in turn, results in a lower leverage ratio. My finding is robust after controlling for the business cycle, firm characteristics, and consideration of liquidity supply. The finding is also robust with different leverage ratio measurements.

I further investigate the role of managerial attention in amplifying the leverage cycles. By adding intersection terms of managerial attention and business cycles, I find that because attention capacity and attention allocation are counter-cyclical, they amplify the effect of the business cycle on firm-level financial decisions. During a recession, the economic downturn will put pressure on a firm’s leverage ratio. My estimation shows that expanded attention capacity doubles the effect from macroeconomics.

My attention measurements and the findings of substitution and scale effect point to some questions for future work. Is managerial attention nature or nurture? Does man-
managerial attention affect financial information released to investors? How does managerial attention impact business cycle dynamics, or long-run innovation, creative destruction, and growth?

**Appendix A**

Table A.1: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of SIC Codes</th>
<th>Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0100-0999</td>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1499</td>
<td>Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1799</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-3999</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-4999</td>
<td>Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000-5199</td>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5200-5999</td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6000-6799</td>
<td>Finance, Insurance and Real Estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7000-8999</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9100-9729</td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9900-9999</td>
<td>Non-classifiable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table is reproduced from the United States Department of Labor [website](#). The SIC codes 1800-1999 are not used.*
Table A.2: Terms Selected with TF-IDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>gdp, monetari, deficit, equilibrium, inflat, unemploy, polici,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agreg, multipli, economist, economi, suppli, wage, export,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>govern, recess, fed, nation, demand, expansionari, labor,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>phillip, stagflat, fiscal, consumpt, fedar, bushel, nomin, surplus,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>econom, consum, employ, macroeconom, currnc, crisi,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tariff, foreign, deflat, crowd, polit, policymak, boom, societi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-specific</td>
<td>bond, firm, dividend, stock, discount, creditor, bankruptci,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equiti, return, financ, loan, yield, stockhold, asset, turnov,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>payment, inventor, matur, valuat, nyse, borrow, debt, liabil,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paid, premium, payabl, flow, vote, tax, analysi, owner, pay,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>depreci, payout, mutual, default, yaho, taxabl, worth, fix, principl,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>short, inflow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.3: Comparative Statics of the Optimal Static Capital Structure Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$\mu_x$</th>
<th>$\sigma_x$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous case</td>
<td>$\gamma_D$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X_D$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$V(X_0)-F(X_0)$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F(X_0)$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous case</td>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>$-/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X_D$</td>
<td>$-/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$V(X_0)-F(X_0)$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F(X_0)$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\mu_x$ represents the mean of cash flow $X$ and $\sigma_x$ is the standard error of $X$. This table is reproduced from Strebulaev and Whited (2011).
Figure A.1: Percent Book Leverage and Market Leverage, from 2004Q1 to 2020Q3

Note: This figure shows aggregated percent book leverage and market leverage by taking the mean of each leverage ratio across the 3481 companies in the sample. The data come from Compustat.
Note: This figure shows that managerial attention capacity and attention allocation towards macroeconomics are counter-cyclical. In recession, managers have higher attention capacity and attention allocation.
Figure A.3: Manager’s Attention is Size Dependent

Note: This figure shows that managerial attention capacity and attention allocation towards macroeconomics are higher for larger firms.

Figure A.4: Manager’s Attention is Liquidity Dependent

Note: This figure shows that managerial attention capacity and attention allocation towards macroeconomics are higher for financially unconstrained firms. Here I define financially unconstrained firms as those that have access to public debt market.
Figure A.5: Manager’s Attention is Profitability Dependent

Note: This figure shows that managerial attention capacity and attention allocation towards macroeconomics are higher for firms with higher profitability.

Figure A.6: Sample Industry Distribution (percent)
Appendix B

Derive the sum of two Brownian Motions. Define \( G_t = \sigma_a W_t^a + \sigma_m W_t^m \).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Var}(G_t - G_s) &= \text{Var}((\sigma_a W_t^a + \sigma_m W_t^m) - (\sigma_a W_s^a + \sigma_m W_s^m)) \\
&= \text{Var}((\sigma_a W_t^a - \sigma_a W_s^a) + (\sigma_m W_t^m - \sigma_m W_s^m)) \\
&= \text{Var}(\sigma_a (W_t^a - W_s^a) + \sigma_m (W_t^m - W_s^m)) \\
&= \sigma_a^2 \text{Var}(W_t^a - W_s^a) + \sigma_m^2 \text{Var}(W_t^m - W_s^m) \\
&\quad + 2 \text{Cov}(\sigma_a (W_t^a - W_s^a), \sigma_m (W_t^m - W_s^m)) \\
&= \sigma_a^2 \text{Var}(W_t^a - W_s^a) + \sigma_m^2 \text{Var}(W_t^m - W_s^m) + 0 \\
&= (t - s)(\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_m^2)
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, \( \frac{G_t}{\sqrt{\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_m^2}} \) is also a Brownian Motion, which I denote as \( W_t^x \). I also assign \( \sigma_x^2 = \sqrt{\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_m^2} \).
REFERENCES


